INTRODUCTION
On 9 October 2006 North Korea announced that it had conducted a nuclear weapons test, its first, at the Chik-tong test site in north Hamgyeong Province. It had been more than eight years since the world's last known nuclear test, carried out by Pakistan on 30 May 1998 (Wallace 1998) . The North Korean event was small (4.2 m b ) and occurred in a part of the world with a relatively low density of accessible (open) broadband seismometers. Therefore, it provides a nice test of the nuclear explosion monitoring capability of the open global seismic network, which is deployed and maintained primarily for the study of earthquakes.
In this study we forgo a comprehensive technical analysis and instead emphasize the extent to which openly available seismic data and related products can be used in a forensic sense to study this politically important event. Much of the material presented here was developed for a discovery-based course entitled "EAS130 Seismology of Nuclear Weapons, " which is taught to freshmen and sophomores at Saint Louis University.
EVENT DETECTION AND LOCATION
The U.S. Geological Survey (USGS) operates the National Earthquake Information Center (NEIC), a 24/7 seismic monitoring facility with global earthquake monitoring capabilities and responsibilities (see http://earthquake.usgs.gov/eqcenter/). Within or near the Korean peninsula, NEIC's sources of realtime data are Global Seismic Network (GSN) stations, cooperative stations in China, and selected stations of the International Monitoring System (IMS). Based on interstation distances, noise characteristics of individual stations, regional attenuation properties, and its association and location algorithms, NEIC estimates that its minimum automatic detection and location threshold for the Korean peninsula is approximately M 4. 5-4.8 (B. Presgrave, personal communication 2006) .
In the week before the North Korean event, a significant number of media outlets were reporting the possibility of a nuclear test. Consequently, NEIC staff reviewed its policy and procedures with regard to locating and reporting seismic activity in the Korean peninsula. Of concern to NEIC was the chance that an earthquake within or near the Korean peninsula might be wrongly reported as an explosion. Smaller subduction zone earthquakes in this region are often characterized by an impulsive P wave and relatively weak seismic coda. Such an event might possibly be interpreted as a shallow, explosion-type source if depth phases are not observed or are misinterpreted.
Due to its small magnitude, the NEIC did not automatically detect and locate the North Korean test. The first information received by NEIC regarding the event came from a major media outlet in Japan approximately 30 minutes after the reported occurrence. Based on an estimated time of occurrence, NEIC analysts were able to identify the onset P-wave times at 17 stations in the distance range of 3.3-81.0 degrees (figure 1 and table 1). The event was located approximately one hour after the origin time using standard least-squares location procedures, the AK135 spherical earth velocity model (Kennett et al. 1995) , and without station-specific travel time corrections. Interpretation of the regional and teleseismically recorded waveforms showed no evidence of seismic depth phases, and the general character of the regional signals was consistent with it being a shallow explosive source (i.e., clear R g waves and first-motions up). Consequently, NEIC analysts held the depth to 0.0 km. Figure 2 shows the USGS location, along with the estimated error ellipse (10.6 km, 83 o , semi-major axis; 7.1 km, 173 o , semi-minor axis). The NEIC location is approximately 4.8 km from the mine tunnel entrance that is thought to be the test site. The tunnel entrance has been located to 4.28 o N 129.08 o E based on openly available satellite images (Kalinowski and Rob 2006) . We attribute the accuracy of the teleseismically derived location to a good distribution of stations both in distance and azimuth about the source and a local earth structure comparable to AK135.
The NEIC reported magnitude (m b = 4.2) was based on the International Association of Seismology and Physics of the Earth's Interior (IASPEI) Working Group on Magnitude Standards. The teleseismically derived m b was calculated at seven stations in the distance range 20.8-50.7 degrees with periods ranging from 0.35 to 0.65 s. Individual station magnitudes ranged between 3.8 and 4.8. Given that NEIC's primary responsibility is global monitoring of earthquake activity, no special modeling was done to account for regionally specific attenuation or to correct for station-specific magnitude bias due to local geology. 
SOURCE DISCRIMINATION
Simple inspection reveals that seismograms of the North Korean explosion have a higher ratio of compressional to shear energy than comparable earthquake seismograms ( figure 3 ). This is a distinctive property of many explosions and is used commonly as a discriminant, especially for those events that are too small for teleseismic m b : M S comparisons. Ideally, we would compare seismograms of the North Korean event to populations of earthquake and explosion seismograms from nearby events and then make a statistical judgment on the confidence with which it could be assigned to the explosion population. However, in this case we lack a suitable database of explosion seismograms, so we address the simpler issue of quantifying the differences of the North Korean event relative to a population of earthquakes.
We made a systematic comparison of regional phase amplitudes for 18 events (including the explosion) that occurred in East Asia and were well-recorded at station MDJ. We chose MDJ specifically because it provided the highest quality recording of the explosion among openly available seismic stations. We selected events that were shallow (h < 40 km) and that occurred within 6 degrees of MDJ during the time period for which data are available via the Incorporated Research Institutions for Seismology (IRIS) Data Management Center (DMC) (http://www.iris.edu). A search of the NEIC catalog available at ftp://hazards.cr.usgs.gov/edr/ revealed 10 events that met the criteria, and we found an additional seven events from the International Seismic Centre (http://www. isc.ac.uk) catalog (table 2) .
Body wave magnitudes were reported for all but four of the events and are in the range of 3.7-4.9 m b . All the distances are regional, with 17 of the 18 events occurring between 2.94 and 5.95 degrees from MDJ. Owing to the narrow ranges for these parameters and the relatively small number of events in the database, we did not attempt any empirical path corrections to the regional phase amplitudes. Such corrections can significantly increase the effectiveness of regional discriminants (e.g., Rodgers and Walter 2002) , so the results listed below should be considered a lower bound on discriminant effectiveness.
For each event we handpicked time windows of 10-30 s that broadly covered the arrivals of P n , P g , and L g . In general, S n is not easily observed in this region (e.g., Rapine and Ni 2003) , and we do not consider it here. Next we filtered the traces in a series of narrow passbands and computed the maximum three-component (vector) amplitude in each phase window. The Butterworth filters had three poles and were centered at 1 Hz, 2 Hz, 3 Hz, and 4 Hz, with corner frequencies defined such that the higher was twice the lower. Ratios of P n / L g and P g / L g were then computed. We assumed that the background noise was constant for the duration of the seismogram and applied no correction. However, the P g and L g amplitudes are influenced to some extent by signal-generated noise, and this could slightly bias the amplitude ratios. The most pronounced effect would be an overestimation of high-frequency L g amplitude for the explosion because of the presence of P g coda.
In all four frequency bands the explosion has the highest (P n , P g ) / L g ratios, and we find increasing separation of the explosion from the earthquake population as the frequency is increased. This is consistent with some previous studies of regional P / S ratios that find increased discrimination power at higher frequencies (e.g., Walter et al. 1995; Hartse et al. 1997) , and is probably related to the fact that P and S corner frequencies for explosions are significantly different, apparently scaling as near-source V P / V S , while P and S corner frequencies for earthquakes are more similar to one another (Fisk 2006) . Thus, P / S discrimination is more effective as frequencies rise above the S explosion corner.
The largest separation of earthquakes and explosion is found at 4 Hz, as shown in figure 4 , in which the earthquake population has a mean P n / L g ratio of 0.168, while the explosion value is 2.15. Assuming a log-normal distribution for the earthquake amplitude ratios, the explosion corresponds to 2.98 standard deviations above the mean. This implies that the explosion comes from a non-earthquake population of seismic sources with a confidence level above 99.99%. Similarly, the earthquake population has a mean P g / L g ratio of 0.398, while the explosion value is 2.32. Again assuming a log-normal distribution, the explosion corresponds to 4.29 standard deviations above the mean, strongly implying that the explosion is distinct from the earthquake population. The reduced scatter in P g / L g ratios relative to P n / L g ratios for the earthquake population is probably related to the fact that P g amplitudes are dependent on a larger range of take-off angles than P n amplitudes. Therefore P g amplitude is not particularly sensitive to the focal mechanism of an earthquake (Campillo et al. 1984) . A second discriminant that is commonly used to separate earthquakes and explosions is comparison of high-frequency to low-frequency energy (e.g., Rodgers and Walter 2002) . Presumably, this results from explosions being temporally more compact than earthquakes and therefore preferentially generating high-frequency energy. For each of the 18 events considered here, we calculated ratios of 4 Hz to 1 Hz energy, for both P n and P g , using the procedure described above. We omitted L g because in the case of the explosion it has essentially no high-frequency energy, and the appropriate window is dominated by P g -generated noise. The results are plotted in figure 4B . Again we find the North Korean test to have the most explosion-like properties, although the separation is not quite as good as in the case of the phase ratios. For P g the 4 Hz/1 Hz ratio of the earthquakes has a mean of 1.84, while the explosion value is 4.20. Assuming log-normal statistics, the explosion is 1.77 standard deviations above the mean. For P n the corresponding numbers are 2.62 for the earthquake mean and 5.46 for the explosion. Assuming lognormal statistics, the explosion is 1.61 standard deviations above the earthquake mean.
A final observation is that the North Korean explosion also separates from the earthquake population in terms of P n / P g ratios, with the explosion having an anomalously large P n (small P g ) amplitude. In this case, the separation is strongest in the middle frequency bands centered at 2 Hz and 3 Hz. Excluding the event that occurred at a distance of 1.6 degrees (for which P n and P g arrive almost simultaneously), the mean P n / P g ratio for the earthquakes is 0.282, while the explosion value is 0.926. Again assuming a log-normal distribution for the amplitude ratios, this corresponds to 1.72 standard deviations above the mean. In other words, based on the observed scatter in P n / P g amplitude ratios, the confidence level is above 99% that the explosion comes from a population of sources distinct from earthquakes. A possible explanation for this is that some of the P g wavetrain is created by near-source S-P conversion, and so the explosion, being deficient in direct S energy is also deficient in P g . However, it is also plausible that the separation in populations is simply a radiation pattern effect in which most of the regional earthquakes are poor excitors of P n , while the isotropic pattern of the explosion is more efficient.
YIELD ESTIMATION
Yield estimation usually relies on empirical scaling laws developed between seismic observables and independently known yields. For instance, well-established relations between m b and yield (Y) for nuclear explosions at the Nevada Test Site (NTS) and the former Soviet test site in Semipalatinsk (STS) are reported in Khalturin et al. (1998) . Using the USGS magnitude of 4.2 m b for the North Korean event, the NTS relationship predicts Y ~ 2.2 kT while the STS relationship predicts Y ~ 0.46 kT. The difference between the two values is mainly a reflection of the difference in geology between the two regions. The western United States is more tectonically active, with correspondingly lower Q, than the region surrounding Semipalatinsk (Kazakstan), and so the high-frequency P-wave energy that goes into m b estimates is more attenuated.
Yield estimates can also be made using low-frequency indicators of the size of an event such as the scalar moment. We determined this quantity for the North Korean test by modeling Rayleigh wave amplitudes. Only two open seismic stations, MDJ and INCN, had signals sufficient for surfacewave analysis. Waveforms from these stations were downloaded from the IRIS DMC, instrument-corrected to ground motion, and rotated into vertical, radial, and transverse components. There was no discernible surface-wave signal on the transverse components, consistent with an explosion source.
The vertical and radial components were analyzed using the multiple filter technique (MFT) to identify the disper- sion of the fundamental mode surface wave and the corresponding spectral amplitude. MFT analysis consists of applying a narrow Gaussian filter to the trace, forming the envelope, and then identifying local maxima of the envelope (Dziewonski et al. 1969; Herrmann 1973) . As long as the arrivals from individual modes are separated in time and do not interfere, the envelope maxima appear at the time of the group arrival and the amplitude corresponds to the spectral amplitude of that arrival. The advantage of MFT analysis is that it permits determination of spectral amplitude of a specific arrival, often in the presence of noise.
We applied the same analysis on synthetic seismograms created with a step source time function, an isotropic moment of 10 20 dyne-cm, at a depth of 0.5 km in the model. Since only long-period spectra are considered and the event is small, source details such as spectral falloff and overshoot are not required. Furthermore, there is little sensitivity to source depth in the upper 1 km with respect to the excitation of the long-period surface wave signal. The Green's functions were calculated from a previously determined velocity model for the Korean peninsula (Herrmann et al. 2006) . We present an example of this process for the vertical component MDJ data in figure 5 .
The isotropic moment (M I ) was estimated by a leastsquares fit to the linear relation,
where A theo and A obs are the observed (in cm-s) and theoretical (in cm-s per 10 20 dyne-cm) spectral amplitudes for a specific frequency ( f i ) on either the radial or vertical components at either INCN or MDJ. A linear regression of the 68 (A theo , A obs ) pairs (figure 6) leads to the estimate of M I = 3.10(±0.62) × 10 21 dyne-cm. Relationships between M I and yield (Y) are discussed by Denny and Johnson (1991) , who found a strong correlation after accounting for shot depth and material properties. For contained explosions, the observed seismic wavefield is modeled in terms of the deformation of a cavity by the application of pressure on the cavity surface. The cavity radius is very sensitive to the depth of burial, although the seismic moment is less sensitive. In an extreme case, a source in a perfectly rigid medium or at infinite overburden pressure would cause no deformation.
Although we do not know the range in material properties forming the Denny and Johnson (1991) data set, we implemented their relations for two end-member cases. One represents NTS-Yucca Flat (Bache et al. 1978) with P velocity, S velocity and density of 2 km/s, 1 km/s, and 2 g/cm 3 , respectively. At the other extreme we use the Herrmann et al. (2006) Korean model with P velocity, S velocity and density of 5.1 km/s, 3.0 km/s, and 2.5 g/cm 3 , respectively. Using these values and a gas porosity of 0.5%, we predicted the isotropic seismic moment as a function of assumed yield and source depth. The results of the computations are shown in figure 7 .
The choice of a particular yield estimate requires knowledge of emplacement depth and near source geology. The topography in this part of North Korea is about 1,000 m above sea level, so the range of depths considered in figure 7 is appropriate. Because the Korean velocity model is representative of the southern part of the peninsula and because of the similarity of geological ages throughout the peninsula, the estimates based on the Korean model are preferred, i.e., 0.25-2.0 kt. This is consistent with the range of highfrequency m b -based yields discussed earlier. Assuming the STS relation between m b and Y is appropriate for the North Korean test site (which is tectonically stable), the resulting yield of about 0.5 kt implies that a source depth of 50-100 m will produce the observed moment.
A potentially large source of uncertainty that is not accounted for in our yield estimates is the degree of coupling achieved in the North Korean test. The estimates given above assume a fully coupled, well-tamped source. Significant decoupling of the explosive device (via detonation in an underground cavity) would lead to a substantial underestimate of the true yield. It is thought that seismic wave amplitudes can be reduced by a factor of 70 if the source is fully decoupled. However, the consistency of our low-frequency and high-frequency yield estimates argues against significant decoupling (see United States Congress [1988, 98-103] for a complete description of decoupling).
CONCLUSIONS
The North Korean nuclear test of 9 October 2006 was widely recorded even though it had a magnitude of only 4.2 m b . Seismometers as far away as the western United States, at distances of more than 80 degrees, detected the event. Furthermore, it was not just small-aperture array stations such as PDAR (Pinedale, Wyoming) that detected the event, but also individual, temporarily installed broadband seismom- eters, such as those that make up the Transportable Array component of the USArray (Ammon and Lay 2007) . Using arrival times from 19 seismic stations the USGS located the event to within 5 km of the nominal test site in North Korea and released the information publicly within about one hour after the origin time.
Comparison of the data recorded at MDJ, the open broadband seismometer nearest the test site, with a comparable set of earthquake seismograms clearly indicates that the North Korean event was an explosion and not an earthquake. Based on P g / L g ratios we estimate a chance of one in more than 20,000 that the MDJ seismogram of the North Korean event was generated by an earthquake. This conclusion is also supported by comparisons of P n / L g ratios and high-frequency/low-frequency amplitude ratios for the earthquake data set. It has been shown elsewhere that MDJ seismograms of the event are also quite similar to those from chemical explosions carried out in the region Kim and Richards 2007) .
Multiple filter analysis of the data recorded at MDJ and INCN gives an isotropic moment of 3.1(±0.62) × 10 21 dyne-cm. Combining relations developed between moment and yield for a series of chemical and nuclear explosions carried out in Nevada with a geologic model of Korea, this moment corresponds to a yield of 0.2-2.0 kt, with most of the uncertainty owing to the unknown source depth. This range of yield estimates is consistent with the 4.2 m b magnitude determined by the USGS.
In summary, using data from open seismometers the North Korean event of 9 October 2006 was successfully located to within 5 km of ground-truth, clearly discriminated as an explosion, and estimated to have a yield of 0.2-2 kT. This analysis illustrates the power of open seismic data as a nuclear verification tool and shows how the USGS and IRIS DMC can act as an important supplement to the IMS.
